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Europe	and	the	Digital	Cold	War:	Is	the	EU
technologically	vulnerable?
The	tech	rivalry	between	China	and	the	United	States	has	been	characterised	by	some	observers	as	a
‘Digital	Cold	War’.	Dimitar	Lilkov	argues	that	in	the	technological	arms	race	of	the	future,	the	EU	may
quickly	find	itself	falling	behind.
In	a	seminal	article,	Swedish	polymath	Nick	Bostrom	posits	the	‘vulnerable	world’	hypothesis.	It	is	a
complex	premise	which	assumes	that	the	chance	of	a	destructive	event	occurring	globally	is	quite
likely	if	technological	advancement	continues	in	a	prolonged	timeline.	He	compares	human	progress	to	drawing
different	balls	from	a	giant	urn	–	most	of	them	are	beneficial	or	mixed	blessings	but	there	are	also	‘black	ball’	events
which	might	destabilise	civilisation.	According	to	Bostrom,	the	preventive	mechanisms	against	a	potential
technological	or	military	doomsday	scenario	range	from	ideal	global	cooperation	to	limiting	the	production	of	certain
technological	items.
This	is	indeed	a	bleak	view,	which	some	might	dismiss	as	yet	another	apocalyptic	prediction.	If	you	observe	the
global	digital	landscape,	however,	you	might	sense	a	storm	brewing.	A	Digital	Cold	War	is	escalating	between	two
economic	giants	whose	digital	juggernauts	are	dominating	global	supply	chains	and	registering	astronomical	profits.
Chinese	surveillance	technology	has	reached	more	than	80	countries	in	Asia,	Africa	and	even	in	the	heart	of	the
EU.	In	parallel,	private	companies	like	Palantir	secure	lucrative	contracts	with	the	US	government	for	monitoring
internet	traffic,	combing	terabytes	of	data	and	providing	behavioural	insights	on	a	staggering	scale.
The	digital	authoritarianism	doctrine	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	is	growing	in	appeal	internationally,	while
unrestrained	data	monopolies	from	Silicon	Valley	excel	at	what	they	do	best	–	accumulating	data	and	acting	as
gatekeepers	to	the	online	world.	The	whole	model	of	Internet	governance	and	international	cooperation	in	the
technological	domain	has	become	defunct	–	you	can`t	replace	the	engine	of	an	old	VW	minivan	with	a	small-scale
nuclear	reactor	and	expect	to	navigate	it	safely	on	the	highways.
The	crippled	shepherd
The	only	geopolitical	actor	actively	working	on	limiting	the	negative	externalities	of	a	free-for-all	technological	race	is
the	European	Union.	In	recent	years,	the	EU	has	tried	to	solve	some	of	the	most	complex	challenges	when	it	comes
to	protecting	user	privacy,	fighting	malign	disinformation	or	trying	to	restrain	unlawful	digital	surveillance.	The	Old
Continent	has	made	an	ambitious	attempt	to	pioneer	the	golden	global	standard	when	it	comes	to	legislation	for	the
digital	domain.
This	effort	has	been	laudable,	but	the	framework	remains	patchy	and	constantly	in	the	making.	Two	years	on,	the
landmark	GDPR	has	reshuffled	the	deck	but	the	Big	Tech	platforms	have	aptly	adapted	to	the	new	situation,	while
national	data	protection	authorities	can’t	cope	due	to	their	small	size	and	embarrassing	budgets.	Key	words	like	‘AI’
or	‘disinformation’	garnish	many	discussions	in	Brussels,	but	are	mostly	centred	around	broad	frameworks	and	lofty
clichés	generated	by	the	US	tech	lobby	in	order	to	dominate	the	discussion.	Lastly,	even	if	binding	regulation
comes	in	place,	this	will	take	several	years	and	will	likely	be	too	little,	too	late.
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Regulation	alone	will	not	hold	unless	this	continent	improves	its	own	global	standing	on	digital	infrastructure,
breakthrough	innovation	and	the	strength	of	its	technological	companies.	At	present,	this	is	sadly	not	the	case.	If	we
look	at	digital	company	market	valuations,	Europe	doesn’t	even	make	it	in	the	Top	20.	Not	surprisingly,	the	2018
French	AI	strategy	gloomily	states	that	France	and	the	EU	might	become	‘digital	colonies’	due	to	external	tech
dominance.	Similar	caution	about	the	EU	lagging	behind	has	also	been	expressed	by	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel.
The	problem	here	is	not	economic	competition	as	such.	The	problem	is	that	we	are	entangled	in	an	ongoing	cyber
war	where	there	are	no	Geneva	conventions	and	where	the	terms	of	engagement	are	still	blurry.	The	question	of
technological	strength	is	essential	for	both	the	economic	prosperity	and	the	personal	security	of	European	citizens.
Strength	as	a	shield
Innovation	and	world-class	technology	have	been	one	of	the	main	ingredients	behind	Europe’s	geopolitical	weight	–
after	all,	a	continent	comprising	just	7	per	cent	of	the	world’s	population	is	generating	close	to	a	quarter	of	global
GDP.	Europe	has	played	an	active	part	in	setting	global	technological	standards	due	to	market	power	and
international	influence.	Unfortunately,	the	EU’s	sway	in	this	arena	is	fading	and	you	can’t	expect	the	world	to	remain
bound	to	an	old	dynamic.
European	leaders	should	finally	commit	not	to	piecemeal	initiatives	but	a	comprehensive	strategy	for	ensuring	the
technological	clout	of	the	Union.	This	would	mean	recognising	the	question	about	5G	infrastructure	as	both	a
technological	and	national	security	priority	where	the	EU	should	go	big	or	go	home.	This	would	mean	pooling
additional	resources	in	the	digital	domain	and	coming	as	close	as	possible	to	a	federal	programme	for	continental
cooperation.	It	is	infuriating	that	the	proposed	long-term	EU	budget	for	digital	competitiveness	has	been	slashed	by
national	leaders	in	the	latest	negotiations.	Politics	and	compromise	still	keep	the	Union	partly	glued	to	the	20th
century,	while	aggressive	global	actors	are	trying	to	plan	decades	ahead.
Recently,	there	have	been	some	positive	signs	that	Europe	is	finally	waking	up.	The	economic	bloc	is	thinking
about	how	to	reduce	its	dependence	on	third	countries	for	critical	raw	materials	and	how	to	become	a	global
supplier	of	advanced	battery	cells.	There	are	high	expectations	for	the	European	cloud	infrastructure	initiative
(Gaia-X)	and	the	establishment	of	a	single	European	market	for	data	as	a	boost	to	industry	across	the	continent.
However,	a	huge	effort	(and	corresponding	funding)	is	still	needed	in	the	domain	of	cybersecurity,	5G	infrastructure,
artificial	intelligence	and	the	further	integration	of	the	European	Digital	Single	Market.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Europe and the Digital Cold War: Is the EU technologically vulnerable? Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-09-18
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/09/18/europe-and-the-digital-cold-war-is-the-eu-technologically-vulnerable/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Strength	can	be	the	only	viable	shield	for	the	EU	in	the	technological	domain.	European	leaders	should	resist	the
urge	to	hide	behind	toothless	documents	or	announce	bombastic	plans	which	carry	more	PR	value	than	actual
benefit.	Remember	the	time	when	France	and	Germany	launched	an	initiative	to	compete	with	Google	and	have	a
truly	European	search	engine?
The	blue	flag	draws	a	black	ball
There	is	a	growing	possibility	that	we	might	see	the	European	Union	losing	the	technological	race	in	the
foreseeable	future.	Why	is	this	a	potentially	catastrophic	scenario	for	the	economic	bloc?	First,	the	EU	would	lose
its	ability	to	influence	global	tech	policy	and	prevent	a	race	to	the	bottom	when	it	comes	to	AI-enhanced
surveillance,	the	unrestricted	exporting	of	dual	use	technological	items	or	the	proliferation	of	lethal	autonomous
weapons.	The	global	system	will	be	heavily	tipped	toward	either	a	more	authoritarian	or	an	unregulated	Wild	West
scenario	on	the	digital	front.	This	would	also	mean	that	vital	cooperation	between	global	actors	holding	advanced
cyber	capabilities	would	become	extremely	difficult,	which	is	a	serious	security	risk	on	its	own.
Second,	if	the	EU	doesn’t	revive	its	drive	for	technological	leadership	and	industrial	strength	by	effectively	pooling
its	resources,	it	will	find	itself	dwarfed	by	North	America	and	Asia.	The	US	will	provide	the	software,	China	will
provide	the	hardware,	and	Europe,	embarrassingly,	will	only	provide	the	data.	This	would	only	lead	to	the
geopolitical	irrelevance	of	the	European	Union	and	a	heavy	hit	on	the	economic	prosperity	of	its	citizens.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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